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How Sanctions Circumvention Allowed Western Luxury Vechicles Into Russia

Banking
Organised Crime Groups
Sanctions Circumvention

Background:

Sanctions against Russia, after the invasion of Ukraine, resulted in the prohibition of the import of luxury goods, including high-end vehicles. Despite these restrictions, luxury cars have continued to surface within Russia, prompting concerns about the existence of a sophisticated sanctions circumvention network. 

One individual of interest is Subject A, a Politically Exposed Person (PEP) from Azerbaijan and a known business figure, who is suspected of facilitating the supply of European luxury vehicles to Russian clients via one of his twenty businesses. Subject A’s nephew, Subject B, is a dual Azerbaijani and British national who resides in the UK as a student. 

Since February 2025, GBP 2.8 million has flowed through Subject B’s newly opened bank account located in Jersey. The account has mainly been funded from an entity in Uzbekistan, and his uncle and aunt (Subject A being his uncle) via accounts in the Middle East and Switzerland. 

Subject B has declared that the funds have been utilised to purchase UK property. However, the origin of the funds, particularly those linked to Subject A, raises significant concerns. It is suspected that these may represent the proceeds of crime, specifically derived from the circumvention of sanctions through the illicit importation of luxury vehicles into Russia via Azerbaijan. Thus, it is highly likely that the property purchased in the UK may be the end product of the sanctions circumvention scheme.

Key Indicators: 

  • Open-source searches confirm the typology of luxury cars being imported from Europe through Azerbaijan to Russia (mainly through shell companies, falsified documents, and smuggling).
  • Adverse media was found in relation to Subject A and sanctions circumvention.
  • A LinkedIn profile was identified for Subject A, which noted his occupation as a Director of a motor company, specialising in the sale, warranty and service of cars.
  • Further checks through screening platforms returned the same spelt name for Subject A as an Azerbaijani PEP.
  • A search was conducted on Subject B’s current address in the UK, which appears as an affluent home, valued at over GBP 1 million – as indicated from an open-source real estate agency website.

Suspicious Activity:

  • Payments routed through multiple jurisdictions with no apparent economic rationale. 
  • Subject B is a holder of accounts in many jurisdictions, including offshore banks (Jersey).
  • Subject A, is a holder of accounts in Switzerland and the Middle East. Some countries in the Middle East have close relations with Russia.
  • Subject B is a student – this correlates with the common typology whereby students have been used to pass money through their accounts for third parties, which usually earns them a benefit for themselves, but in this case, it concerns Subject B’s family members routing money through his account.
  • Subject B’s residence is not typical of student accommodation in the UK.
  • Minimal funds left in the Jersey account, further evidencing the flow-through intent and speed of obtaining a reputable asset (UK property) in a short space of time (since February).
  • Although Subject B appeared transparent in informing the Jersey bank that funds would be received to purchase UK property, there was a lack of transparency and false indication as to the value of funds that would be deposited into the account – Subject B advised an initial deposit of GBP 100,000 from Switzerland and Uzbekistan, the Middle East and Luxembourg. Evidently, a much larger amount has been deposited.


FIU Actions:

  • Further intelligence collected on Subject A, his wife and Subject B.
  • Intelligence shared with the relevant jurisdictions.
  • We would routinely liaise with local and international sanctions bodies, such as the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI). 
  • All FIU staff undertake training on sanctions to understand sanctions circumvention techniques, and the FIU has a close relationship with Financial Sanctions Implementation Unit (FSIU) to collaborate on typologies and casework.
  • The FIU continues to disseminate educational pieces / insights / typologies to better inform Jersey’s financial services industry to highlight the different growing techniques used by criminals and state threat actors to evade sanctions.
  • The FIU have dedicated staff members as sanctions Specialist Point of Contact (SPOC), enabling them to researching and share valuable education pieces on circumvention methods.

Outcomes:

  • Through the use of Jersey’s Public Private Partnership (PPP) - Jersey Financial Intelligence Network (JFIN),  enable financial service providers to be alerted to such a typology to help identify transactions related to sanctions circumvention. In addition, FIU staff participate in specialist industry risk round-tables events organised by Jersey Finance to educate their members and raise awareness.
  • Banks can enhance monitoring of accounts opened by non-Jersey residents not only during geopolitical conflicts, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also now, when sanctions are still in place, and methods of circumvention continue to adapt and develop.
  • This activity is helpful for banks to consider changing vulnerabilities in their client onboarding processes and if they require further controls or approaches relating to Know Your Client (KYC), Client Due Diligence (CDD), Source of Wealth (SoW) and Source of Funds (SoF) as well as transaction monitoring.

 

FIU Comment:

  • The involvement of Subject B, a student in the UK, illustrates a common tactic in sanctions circumvention and Money-Laundering (ML); the use of family members with clean profiles to distance illicit funds from the primary actor (Subject A). 
  • Jersey, being a reputable financial offshore jurisdiction, adds a layer of legitimacy to the transactions, making detection more difficult (in terms of the UK property purchase).
  • The flow of funds through Uzbekistan and European financial institutions highlights the use of multi-jurisdictional layering to obscure the origin of funds. Uzbekistan, in particular, may serve as a strategic intermediary due to its geographic and political proximity to both Russia and Azerbaijan. 
  • The involvement of luxury cars could suggest a trade-based ML scheme, where high-value goods are used to move value across borders. 
  • The use of funds for UK property purchase is a typical integration method in ML.
  • Financial institutions and DNFBPs, such as legal and real estate sectors involved in these transactions may face sanctions exposure if found to have facilitated the movement or integration of illicit funds. This underscores the importance of robust CDD and Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD), including PEP screening, SoW verification, and transaction monitoring.
  • Jersey, along with local and regional partners, continually monitors and risk assesses exposure to different regions and the changing global situation, especially in relation to countries that have significant risks or sanctions programmes associated to them. Understanding the relationship and use of a third country to potentially obfuscate activity, is an important risk metric.

Related criminality:

Organised Crime Groups

OCGs are structured criminal organisations that engage in illegal activities for profit. These groups often operate hierarchically, with defined roles and responsibilities among members. OCGs may be involved in a variety of illicit enterprises, including drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling, extortion, money laundering, and racketeering.

Typically characterised by their secrecy and sophistication, OCGs utilise corruption, violence, and intimidation to maintain their operations and protect their interests. They often have connections to legitimate businesses, which they may use to launder money or further their criminal activities. The influence of OCGs can extend across borders, making them significant players in international crime networks.

The presence of OCGs poses serious challenges to law enforcement agencies, as their operations are often well-coordinated and strategically planned. Efforts to dismantle these organisations require cooperation between national and international authorities, as well as community involvement to address the social issues that allow organised crime to flourish.

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Sanctions Circumvention

Sanctions evasion refers to the act of circumventing or violating economic sanctions imposed by governments or international bodies. These sanctions are typically put in place to restrict trade, financial transactions, or other interactions with specific countries, entities, or individuals due to political, military, or human rights concerns. Evasion can take various forms, such as using third-party countries to conduct transactions, falsifying documents, or employing complex financial networks to disguise the origin or destination of goods and services. Companies or individuals engaging in sanctions evasion risk legal penalties, including heavy fines and criminal charges, and contribute to undermining the effectiveness of international sanctions designed to promote global stability and uphold human rights.

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